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Abstract—Owing to the vulnerability of relay-assisted and
device-to-device (D2D) communications, improving wireless se-
curity from a physical layer signal processing perspective is
attracting increasing interest. Hence we address the problem of
secure transmission in a relay-assisted network, where a pair of
legitimate user equipments (UEs) communicate with the aid of a
multiple-input multiple output (MIMO) relay in the presence of
multiple eavesdroppers (eves). Assuming imperfect knowledge
of the eves’ channels, we jointly optimize the power of the
source UE, the amplify-and-forward (AF) relaying matrix and
the covariance of the artificial noise (AN) transmitted by the
relay, in order to maximize the received signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the destination, while imposing a
set of robust secrecy constraints. To tackle the resultant non-
convex optimization problem, a globally optimal solution based
on a bi-level optimization framework is proposed, but with
high complexity. Then a low-complexity sub-optimal method
relying on a new penalized difference-of-convex (DC) algorith-
mic framework is proposed, which is specifically designed for
non-convex semidefinite programs (SDPs). We show how this
penalized DC framework can be invoked for solving our robust
secure relaying problem with proven convergence. Our extensive
simulation results show that both proposed solutions are capable
of ensuring the secrecy of the relay-aided transmission and
significantly improve the robustness towards the eves’ channel
uncertainties as compared to the non-robust counterparts. It is
also demonstrated the penalized DC-based method advocated
yields a performance close to the globally optimal solution.
Index Terms—Amplify-and-forward, difference-of-convex,
eavesdropping, multiple-input multiple-output, physical layer
security, relaying, robust optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of smartphones storing more sensi-
tive personal data ranging from social networking to online
banking, wireless end-users have become vulnerable targets
of hackers. According to a recent report on mobile cyber
threats, the number of cyber attacks to mobile users has been
dramatically growing, e.g., by nearly 10-fold from August
2013 to March 2014 [1]. Within this context, how to ensure
information security is becoming a critical issue for wireless
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service providers. Although the classic bit-level encryption
technique has been deemed to be most effective way of
achieving this goal, a recent report by the Washington Post
has drawn public attention to the potential security risks
of wireless technologies, even when advanced encryption is
used1. Against this background, physical layer security is
emerging as a promising design alternative to complement
classic encryption and to further enhance the security of
wireless networks.
Since Wyner opened this new avenue of security pro-
vision by introducing the notion of secrecy capacity [3],
researchers have sought to enhance security for a wide range
of communication channel models, as discussed in [4]–[6] and
the references therein. Recently, physical layer security has
attracted increased interest, driven by new techniques such
as cooperative relaying, which has found its way into the
Long-Term Evolution (LTE) standard. Although the diversity
advantages gleaned from user cooperation have been recog-
nized in the context of generic relay-assisted networks [7],
[8], ensuring secrecy in message relaying remains a key issue.
Specifically, when additional intermediate nodes assist in for-
warding the source messages, the information confidentiality
may be more readily compromised, unless the relaying scheme
is appropriately designed. It was demonstrated in [9] that
relaying is capable of improving the level of security. This
seminal work has led to further research endeavors devoted
to investigating the secrecy of relay-assisted communications
from the physical layer perspective [10]. Following this trend,
in this paper emphasis will be on new signal processing
techniques conceived for improving wireless relaying security.
Below we briefly review related works on this research topic
and summarize our main contributions.
A. Related Works
A wireless relay can adopt either the amplify-and-forward
(AF) or the decode-and-forward (DF) strategy for forwarding
source messages. For DF relaying, the optimal weights that
achieve the maximum secrecy capacity are derived in [11],
[12]. As compared to DF, AF relaying offers its inherent
advantages of lower signal processing complexity and latency,
and hence will be the focus of our attention. A variety of
relaying solutions such as beamforming, cooperative jamming
1In [2], it is reported that two German researchers have demonstrated how
to exploit the security flaws in the Signaling System 7 (SS7) to eavesdrop
on all incoming and outgoing calls indefinitely from anywhere in the world.
They have shown how to decode the messages by requesting each caller’s
carrier to release a temporary encryption key through the SS7.
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2and artificial noise (AN) generation, or a hybrid of the
aforementioned options, have been studied in [?], [13]–[22].
For instance, the optimal AF relaying weights maximizing the
achievable secrecy rate of a single-antenna relay network are
derived in [13], without consideration of the source informa-
tion leakage to eves. When multiple antennas are employed
at both the source and relay, joint transmit precoding and
power allocation relying on the generalized singular value
decomposition (GSVD) is proposed in [14]. Finally, joint
source transmit precoding and multi-antenna AF relaying is
investigated in [15] assuming an untrusted relay node.
The contributions [13]–[15] assume perfect knowledge of
each eve’s channel state information (ECSI) at the legitimate
nodes. In practice, due to the lack of explicit cooperation
between the latter and eves, at best an inaccurate estimate
of the ECSI may be available2. Assuming that the ECSI
errors lie in a predefined norm-bounded region, joint relay
beamforming and jamming signal design in a single-antenna
relay network is developed in [16], [17] with the objective
of maximizing the worst-case secrecy rate. Extension of this
approach to a more generalized model where multi-antenna is
employed at the relay is considered in [18], [19]. Minimization
of the mean square error (MSE) of the received signal at
the destination, subject to a set of signal-to-interference-
plus-noise (SINR)-based secrecy constraints, is considered
in [20]. Using the same uncertainty model, the problem of
total relaying power minimization is studied in [21], [22] by
simultaneously guaranteeing a predefined quality-of-service
(QoS) level at the destination and a certain secrecy level
against eavesdropping. Finally, [19] assumes a more general
relay system configuration, where some of the prior works
can be viewed as a special case. In this work, a globally
optimal solution is obtained resorting to a bi-level optimization
framework, where the upper-level problem is tackled by one-
dimensional search, while the inner-level problem is solved by
semidefinite relaxation (SDR) [24].
B. Contributions
This paper considers a general wireless communication
scenario, where a source (S) transmits its confidential data
to a destination (D), assisted by a multi-antenna AF relay (R).
Both phases of the two-hop transmission are overheard by a set
of independent eves. The power of S, the AF relaying matrix
and the covariance matrix of the AN emitted by R have to be
jointly optimized for protecting the message confidentiality.
In contrast to most of the prior contributions [11]–[14], [16]–
[19], where the main focus has been on the maximization of
the (worst-case) secrecy rate when either perfect or imperfect
ECSI is available, we consider the problem from the alter-
native perspective of the security-reliability trade-off recently
introduced in [25], [26]. Specifically, assuming that the ECSI
2A notable example is the device-to-device (D2D) discovery and commu-
nication defined in 3GPP LTE Rel. 12 [23]. Each UE (including the potential
eves) periodically broadcasts its own beacon signals and listens to others
using a small portion of the LTE uplink resources. In this way, each UE is
able to discover the presence of other UEs (including potential eves in its
proximity) and subsequently infers an imprecise ECSI estimate based on the
approximate distance and pathloss coefficients.
errors reside in a spherical region, we aim for maximizing
the received SINR at D, subject to specific power constraints,
while satisfying a set of robust secrecy constraints at eves.
Our contributions are detailed as follows:
• We find the global optimum for the formulated non-
convex problem by reformulating the latter as a bi-level
optimization problem, where an SDR-based solution is
derived for the inner problem and the tightness of such a
relaxation is proved.
• We propose a new penalized difference-of-convex (DC)
algorithmic framework for a class of general non-convex
semidefinite programs (SDPs), which eliminates the need
for a non-trivial feasible initialization routinely required
by the conventional DC algorithm [27]. We explicitly
prove that the solution sequence generated by the al-
gorithm converges to a stationary point of the original
problem.
• We show how the secrecy-constrained robust relaying
problem can be transformed into the form solvable by
the penalized DC algorithm and subsequently, we apply
the proposed algorithm to solve the design problem
efficiently.
• We perform extensive numerical simulations for com-
paring the performance of the proposed solutions to
other benchmarking schemes. We demonstrate that the
penalized DC-based solution is capable of achieving ap-
proximately the same performance as the globally optimal
solution at a significantly reduced complexity.
C. Organization and Notations
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the relay system model and formulates our secrecy-
constrained robust relaying problem. The globally optimal so-
lution relying on the SDR and on a one-dimensional exhaustive
search is presented in Section III. In Section IV, we propose a
penalized DC algorithmic framework and characterize its con-
vergence. We then invoke the proposed framework for solving
our secure relaying problem in Section V. The performance of
the proposed solutions is quantified via numerical simulations
in Section VI. Finally, we conclude in Section VII.
Boldface uppercase (lowercase) letters denote matrices (vec-
tors), while normal letters denote scalars; (·)∗, (·)T , (·)H , and
(·)−1 denote the conjugate, transpose, Hermitian transpose and
inverse, respectively; ‖·‖ represents the Euclidean norm of a
vector, while ‖·‖F denotes the Frobenius norm of a matrix;
Tr(·), vec(·), and ⊗ stand for the matrix trace, vectorization
and the Kronecker product, respectively; CM×M and HM
denotes the spaces of M×M matrices having complex entries
and M ×M Hermitian matrices, respectively; Re{·} denotes
the real part of a complex number; λmax[·] denotes the largest
eigenvalue of a Hermitian matrix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We commence by presenting the specific communication
scenario, where multiple independent eves can potentially
overhear the relay-assisted transmission, and subsequently
formulate the robust secure relaying problem.
3Source User Dest. User
Relay
Independent Eves
h1 hH2
g1k g
H
2k
…
…
Fig. 1: MIMO relay network in the presence of multiple single-
antenna eves.
A. MIMO Relay System in the Presence of Eavesdroppers
Consider the wireless network as depicted in Fig. 1, where
source S communicates with destination D, assisted by a
trusted AF relay R operating in a half-duplex mode. The
signals transmitted during the S → R and R → D hops
are overheard by K independent eves, Ek for k ∈ K ,
{1, 2, · · · ,K}. We assume that S, D and Ek, ∀k ∈ K are
single-antenna UEs having limited signal processing capabil-
ities and low power budgets. By contrast, R is equipped with
NR ≥ 2 antennas. It is assumed that no direct link is available
between S–D due to the severe pathloss.
A narrowband flat-fading channel model is considered,
where we denote the S–R channel by h1 ∈ CNR×1 and the
Hermitian transpose of the R–D channel by h2 ∈ CNR×1. Let
s denote the S information symbol, modeled as a zero-mean
Gaussian random variable with a power of σ2S ≤ PS, where
PS denotes the S power budget. During the first transmission
slot, the signal received at R is given by
z = h1s+ nR, (1)
where nR is a zero-mean additive noise vector with covariance
of σ2RINR . Then R applies a linear AF transformation matrix
W ∈ CNR×NR to the received signal, and superimposes an AN
vector onto the linearly processed signal. Hence, the signal to
be forwarded to D is given by
r = Wz+ v = Wh1s+WnR + v, (2)
where v denotes the AN vector with zero mean and covariance
of E{vvH} = Ψ to be optimized. The relay R has the power
constraint of σ2S‖Wh1‖2 + σ2R‖W‖2F + Tr(Ψ) ≤ PR, where
PR denotes its power budget. During the second transmission
slot, D receives the following signal:
yD = h
H
2 Wh1s+ h
H
2 WnR + h
H
2 v + nD, (3)
where nD is an additive noise with zero mean and a variance
of σ2D.
We adopt, as a metric of transmission reliability, the re-
ceived SINR at D given by
SINRD =
σ2S|hH2 Wh1|2
σ2R‖hH2 W‖2 + hH2 Ψh2 + σ2D
. (4)
During the transmission, each Ek is potentially capable of
overhearing the signals transmitted both from S and R. Let
g1k and g2k ∈ CNR×1, respectively, denote the S–Ek channel
and the Hermitian transpose of the R–Ek channel. Then the
signals observed by Ek from S and R, respectively, are given
by
ySE,k = g1ks+ nE,1k (5)
yRE,k = g
H
2kWh1s+ g
H
2kWnR + g
H
2kv + nE,2k, (6)
where nE,1k and nE,2k are additive noise terms with zero mean
and a variance of σ2E,k. In practice, eves typically prefer to
monitor and decode the real-time data from the legitimate
UEs. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the eves are
configured on an instantaneous basis and that they rely on
selection diversity combining for the sake of simplicity. On
this basis, the mutual information leakage to each Ek can
therefore be expressed as
CE,k(σS,W,Ψ) =
1
2
max
{
log2
(
1 +
σ2S|g1k|2
σ2E,k
)
,
log2
(
1 +
σ2S|gH2kWh1|2
σ2R‖gH2kW‖2 + gH2kΨg2k + σ2E,k
)}
, (7)
where the coefficient 12 is due to the fact that the relay-assisted
transmission requires a pair of orthogonal time slots in half-
duplex mode.
In contrast to prior contributions [11]–[14], [16]–[19], which
target maximizing the secrecy capacity, we aim for achieving
the best transmission reliability, while ensuring that the infor-
mation is safe to a certain extent. Specifically, assuming that in
a practical communication system S is operating at a fixed data
rate Rd, which is lower than its maximum achievable secrecy
rate, we jointly optimize σS, W and Ψ, subject to the power
constraints, in order to maximize the received SINR at D, while
satisfying a set of secrecy constraints. Mathematically, this
problem can be formulated as
max
σS,W,Ψ
σ2S|hH2 Wh1|2
σ2R‖hH2 W‖2 + hH2 Ψh2 + σ2D
(8a)
s.t. CE,k(σS,W,Ψ) ≤ κRd, k ∈ K (8b)
σ2S‖Wh1‖2 + σ2R‖W‖2F + Tr(Ψ) ≤ PR (8c)
σ2S ≤ PS, Ψ  0, (8d)
where (8b) is the so-called secrecy constraints, which is
defined from the perspective of information theoretical se-
curity [28], [29]. Specifically, secrecy can be achieved by
constraining the mutual information leakage below the data
rate of the legitimate UEs. In the above formulation, the
concept of a penalty 0 < κ ≤ 1 is introduced for controlling
the level of security required. Solving (8) requires perfect
knowledge of all the ECSI {g1k,g2k}. However, due to the
lack of explicit cooperation between the legitimate UEs and
eves, only imperfect estimates of the ECSI may be available
at the legitimate UEs. It is therefore important to take into
consideration the uncertainties in the ECSI and to enforce the
secrecy constraints for a wide range of channel realizations.
To this end, the concept of robust secrecy constraints will be
introduced in the next subsection.
4B. Robust Secrecy Constraint
Like most of the prior contributions in the robust transceiver
design literature [8], [19], [30]–[33], we model the unknown
ECSI by introducing error terms ∆g1k and ∆g2k, yielding:
g1k = gˆ1k + ∆g1k, g2k = gˆ2k + ∆g2k, (9)
where gˆ1k and gˆ2k denote the imperfect ECSI estimates, while
again, ∆g1k and ∆g2k capture the corresponding uncertain-
ties. Hereby we assume that the ECSI errors lie in some
predefined bounded sets, yielding:
G1k ,
{
∆g1k : |∆g1k|2 ≤ ε1k
}
(10)
G2k ,
{
∆g2k : ‖∆g2k‖2 ≤ ε2k
}
, (11)
where εik, i ∈ {1, 2} denotes the radius of the uncertainty
region. The norm-bounded ECSI error model motivates the
so-called worst-case robust design approach, which seeks to
maximize the received SINR, while satisfying the secrecy
constraints for any possible realization of the ECSI errors
within the predefined regions. The “robust” version of (8) can
thus be formulated as
max
σS,W,Ψ
SINRD (12a)
s.t. CE,k(σS,W,Ψ; ∆g1k,∆g2k) ≤ κRd,
∀∆g1k ∈ G1k,∆g2k ∈ G2k, k ∈ K (12b)
σ2S‖Wh1‖2 + σ2R‖W‖2F + Tr(Ψ) ≤ PR (12c)
σ2S ≤ PS, Ψ  0. (12d)
One can observe that (12) is not jointly convex in (σS,W,Ψ)
and hence in general it is difficult to solve. Additionally,
the robust secrecy constraint (12b) renders (12) semi-infinite,
which is mathematically challenging. To circumvent these
problems, both a globally optimal and a low-complexity sub-
optimal solutions will be proposed in the following sections.
III. GLOBALLY OPTIMAL SOLUTION TO THE ROBUST
SECRECY PROBLEM
In this section, we develop a globally optimal solution to the
robust secrecy problem (12). Since it is challenging to jointly
optimize the tuple of (σS,W,Ψ) due to the non-convex nature
of the problem, let us consider a sub-problem of (12), where
the aim is to solve for the optimal pair (W,Ψ), while fixing
the value of σS. Substituting the expression of CE,k (7) into
(12b) and neglecting the terms independent of (W,Ψ), we
arrive at the sub-problem (13), shown at the top of the next
page, where τ(σS) denotes the objective value, which depends
on σS. With the aid of (13), the original problem (12) can
equivalently be expressed as
max
σS
τ(σS) s.t. 0 ≤ σS ≤ σ¯S, (14)
where σS is lower bounded by zero, while the upper bound
σ¯S can be found by solving the following problem:
σ¯S = arg max
σS≤PS
σS
s.t. max
∆g1k∈G1k
log2
(
1 +
σ2S|g1k|2
σ2E,k
)
≤ κRd, k ∈ K . (15)
The resultant solution is given by
σ¯S = min
{√
PS,min
k∈K
{
γσ2E,k∣∣|gˆ1k|+√ε1k∣∣2
}}
, (16)
where γ , 22κRd−1. The reformulated problem (14) leads to a
simpler single-variable optimization problem defined over the
interval [0, σ¯S]. Assuming that τ(σS) can be evaluated at any
feasible σS, a one-dimensional exhaustive search procedure
can be invoked for finding the global optimum of (12). Let
us now focus our attention on computing τ(σS) for a given
feasible σS, which however requires solving the non-convex
sub-problem (13). The solution to (13) will be addressed in
the following.
We begin by tackling the challenge posed by the infinite
number of constraints in (13c). After some further manipula-
tions, we can rewrite (13c) as
∆gH2kΘ(W,Ψ)∆g2k + 2 Re
{
gˆH2kΘ(W,Ψ)∆g2k
}
+ gˆH2kΘ(W,Ψ)gˆ2k − γσ2E,k ≤ 0, ∀∆g2k ∈ G2k, (17)
where we have Θ(W,Ψ) ,W
(
σ2Sh1h
H
1 − γσ2RINR
)
WH −
γΨ. As a popular technique of tackling the infiniteness,
we invoke the so-called S-Procedure [34] for equivalently
recasting (17) as
Mk(W,Ψ, ρk) , Λk(ρk)−PHk Θ(W,Ψ)Pk  0, (18)
where we have Λk(ρk) = blkdiag(ρkINR , γσ
2
E,k − ε2kρk)
and Pk = [INR , gˆ2k]. Replacing (13b) by (18), the sub-
problem (13) can now be rewritten in a finite form as
max
W,Ψ
σ2S|hH2 Wh1|2
σ2R‖hH2 W‖2 + hH2 Ψh2 + σ2D
(19a)
s.t. σ2S‖Wh1‖2 + σ2R‖W‖2F + Tr(Ψ) ≤ PR (19b)
Λk(ρk)−PHk Θ(W,Ψ)Pk  0, k ∈ K (19c)
Ψ  0. (19d)
The above formulation remains non-convex and to proceed,
we have to transform it into an appropriate form, where the
SDR is applicable. Let us define w = vec(W) and X =
wwH . Interestingly, after some matrix manipulations, which
have been relegated to Appendix A, we are now able to rewrite
(19) in a form, which only involves linear terms in X and Ψ.
The results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Define
Q0 = σ
2
S(h
∗
1h
T
1 )⊗ (h2hH2 ) (20)
Q1 = σ
2
RINR ⊗ (h2hH2 ) (21)
Q2 = σ
2
S(h
∗
1h
T
1 )⊗ INR + σ2RIN2R (22)
Q3(X,Ψ) = σ
2
SH1XH
H
1 − γσ2R
NR∑
l=1
ElXE
H
l − γΨ, (23)
where Q3(·) is a linear mapping of X and Ψ with H1 =
hT1 ⊗ INR and El =
[
0NR×(l−1)NR , INR ,0NR×(NR−l)NR
]
. Then,
5τ(σS) , max
W,Ψ0
σ2S|hH2 Wh1|2
σ2R‖hH2 W‖2 + hH2 Ψh2 + σ2D
(13a)
s.t. σ2S‖Wh1‖2 + σ2R‖W‖2F + Tr(Ψ) ≤ PR (13b)
log2
(
1 +
σ2S|gH2kWh1|2
σ2R‖gH2kW‖2 + gH2kΨg2k + σ2E,k
)
≤ κRd, ∀∆g2k ∈ G2k, k ∈ K. (13c)
problem (19) can equivalently be rewritten as follows:
max
X,Ψ,ρ
Tr(Q0X)
Tr(Q1X) + Tr(h2hH2 Ψ) + σ
2
D
(24a)
s.t. Tr(Q2X) + Tr(Ψ) ≤ PR (24b)
Λk(ρk)−PHk Q3(X,Ψ)Pk  0, k ∈ K (24c)
X  0, Ψ  0, Rank(X) = 1. (24d)
Upon neglecting the non-convex rank-one constraint in (24d),
(24) is relaxed to a so-called fractional SDP, which can
further be recast into a standard SDP via the Charnes-Cooper
transformation [35]. Specifically, by introducing an auxiliary
variable s > 0, and defining X = sX, Ψ = sΨ and ρ = sρ,
(24) is conveniently transformed into
max
X,Ψ,ρ,s>0
Tr(Q0X) (25a)
s.t. Tr(Q1X) + Tr(h2hH2 Ψ) + sσ
2
D ≤ 1 (25b)
Tr(Q2X) + Tr(Ψ) ≤ sPR (25c)
Λk(ρk)−PHk Q3(X,Ψ)Pk  0, k ∈ K (25d)
X  0, Ψ  0. (25e)
Interestingly, (25) now becomes a convex SDP, which can
be efficiently solvable by generic optimization tools such
as SeDuMi [36] and MOSEK [37] by relying on interior-
point methods [38]. We remark that (25) and the rank-relaxed
version of (24) are equivalent in the sense that the optimal
solution X∗ to (24) after rank-one relaxation can be retrieved
from the optimal solution (X
∗
, s∗) to (25), i.e., X∗ = X
∗
/s∗,
and the resultant objective values of the two problems are
equivalent (see [19] for a detailed proof of this equivalence).
After obtaining the rank-relaxed solution X∗, a natural
question arises as to how good a solution is X∗, i.e., does it
satisfy the rank-one optimality condition of (24)? Answering
this question directly from the formulation of (25) is still an
open problem in the literature. To overcome this difficulty, we
follow an approach similar to [19]. Specifically, denoting the
objective value of (25) by τ∗relax(σS), we consider the following
power minimization problem:
min
X,Ψ,ρ
Tr(Q2X) (26a)
s.t.
Tr(Q0X)
Tr(Q1X) + Tr(h2hH2 Ψ) + σ
2
D
≥ τ∗relax(σS) (26b)
Tr(Q2X) + Tr(Ψ) ≤ PR (26c)
Λk(ρk)−PHk Q3(X,Ψ)Pk  0, k ∈ K (26d)
X  0, Ψ  0. (26e)
Observe that (26) is also a standard SDP and therefore it is
readily solvable by existing optimization tools. Furthermore,
its specific structure allows us to obtain the following useful
result, based on which we will be able to retrieve an optimal
rank-one solution of (24).
Proposition 2: Let us denote the optimal solution of (26)
by (Xo,Ψo, ρo). Assuming suitable constraint qualification of
(26), (Xo,Ψo, ρo) is also an optimal solution of (24), i.e., Xo
must be of rank one.
The proof follows arguments similar to those in [19, Ap-
pendices B–C], which is therefore omitted for brevity. The
key ingredient of the proof is to show that Xo is of rank one,
which can be achieved by examining the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) conditions for (26).
In summary, obtaining an optimal solution of (14) now
consists of two steps: 1) solve the rank-relaxed SDP (25)
and obtain the largest τ∗relax(σS) by exhaustive search over σS;
2) solve the power minimization problem (26) based on the
obtained τ∗relax(σS). Since the rank-one optimality condition of
Xo is guaranteed, the optimal AF matrix Wo can be retrieved
by rank-one decomposition of Xo, i.e., Xo = xo(xo)H ,
followed by converting xo to Wo via vector-matrix reshaping.
We emphasize that solving (14) requires performing an
exhaustive search for σS over [0, σ¯S]. In each step, we
have to solve the SDP (25), which involves on the order of
O(N4R + N2R + 1) optimization variables and K semidefinite
cone constraints of dimension (NR + 1)2. Hence, (25) can
be solved with a worst-case complexity, which is on the or-
der of O (K(N4R +N2R + 1)2(NR + 1)2) [39]. The associated
computational cost escalates as the number of relay anten-
nas or eves increases, which may become computationally
prohibitive in practical problems. Motivated by this issue, a
low-complexity sub-optimal algorithm will be conceived in
the next section.
IV. A PENALIZED DC ALGORITHMIC FRAMEWORK
Achieving the global optimum presented in Section III may
only become computationally affordable when the problem
size is small; nevertheless, it remains useful in general as a
baseline for benchmarking other algorithms. As an alternative,
we propose here a low-complexity algorithm by resorting to a
new penalized DC algorithmic framework. We first expose this
framework, which can be considered as an extended variation
of the conventional DC framework [40]. Then as a second
contribution, since the results of convergence analysis in the
conventional DC are not directly applicable to this extended
framework, we explicitly state and prove the convergence
properties of the new penalized DC algorithm.
6A. Penalized DC Algorithmic Framework
We first introduce a few definitions prior to the algorithm
design:
Definition 1 (Positive Semi-Definite (PSD)-Convex Mapping):
A matrix-valued mapping F (·) : Cn → Hp is called PSD-
convex on a convex subset Ω ⊆ Cn, if for all x,y ∈ Ω and θ
with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, we have
F (θx+ (1− θ)y)  θF (x) + (1− θ)F (y). (27)
Definition 2 (Directional Derivative of Matrix-Valued Mapping):
The directional derivative of a matrix-valued mapping F at x
is a linear mapping DF : Cn → Hp, which is defined by
DFh =
n∑
i=1
hi
∂F
∂xi
(x), ∀h ∈ Cn. (28)
Definition 3 (PSD-DC Program): A PSD-DC program as-
sumes the form of
min
x∈Ω
ϕ(x) , f0(x)− g0(x) (29a)
s.t. F i(x)−G i(x)  0, i ∈ I , {1, 2, · · · , I} (29b)
where Ω ⊆ Cn is a non-empty, closed convex set, f0(·), g0(·) :
Cn → R are continuously differentiable convex functions on
Ω, and F i(·), G i(·),Cn → Hpi are continuously differentiable
PSD-convex mappings on Ω.
We know that a PSD-convex mapping provides a general-
ization of a convex function, since any convex function with
f(·) : Cn → R is PSD-convex in conjunction with p = 1.
Similarly, a PSD-DC program generalizes a conventional DC
program, where an inequality constraint, e.g., fi(x)−gi(x) ≤
0 is now extended to a generalized inequality  on a PSD
cone. If g0(·) is nonlinear and one of the G i(·) is a nonlinear
mapping, then (29) becomes a general non-convex nonlinear
SDP.
To solve (29), similar to the conventional DC framework
[27] which involves only scalar-valued functions, an iterative
algorithm can be developed, where the main idea is to find
a local linear approximation of the non-convex parts of (29)
around the solution obtained in the previous iteration. In this
way, the original non-convex problem can then be iteratively
solved by a sequence of “convexified” sub-problems. Assum-
ing that x(n) is a solution obtained at the nth iteration, the
linearized sub-problem is then given by
min
x∈Ω
f0(x)− g0(x(n))−∇gT0 (x(n))(x− x(n)) (30a)
s.t. F i(x)−G i(x(n))−DG i(x(n))(x−x(n))  0, i ∈ I.
(30b)
In order to generate a sequence of feasible solutions
{x(n)}∞n=0, a feasible initialization x(0) is required by the
iterative algorithm3. Otherwise, if the algorithm starts with an
infeasible point, it can lead to further infeasibility problems
during the successive iterations. However, finding a “good”
feasible initialization for a non-convex problem in principle is
not a simple task, as argued further in Section V.
3This is due to the fact that the first-order Taylor series expansion of the
concave function −G i(·) is its upper bound, such that we have F i(x) −
G i(x)  F i(x)−G i(x(n))−DG i(x(n))(x− x(n))  0 for all x ∈ Ω.
Algorithm 1 Penalized DC Algorithm
Intialization: An initial point x(0) ∈ Ω, τ (0) > 0, δ1 > 0
and δ2 > 0. Set n = 0.
repeat
1. Convexify: Compute the first-order approximates
g0(x) ≈ g0
(
x(n)
)
+∇gT0
(
x(n)
)(
x− x(n))
G i
(
x
) ≈ G i(x(n))+DG i(x(n))(x− x(n))
2. Solve: Compute x(n+1) by solving (31)
3. Update τ : Obtain the dual variable Φ(n+1)i
associated with (31b) and set
τ (n+1) =
{
τ (n) if τ (n) ≥ r(n)
τ (n) + δ2 if τ (n) < r(n)
(32)
where
r(n) , min
{
‖x(n+1) − x(n)‖−1, λmax
[ I∑
i=1
Φ
(n+1)
i
]
+ δ1
}
4. Update iteration: n← n+ 1
until Termination criterion is satisfied or a maximum
number of iterations is reached
Output: The optimized x∗.
Motivated by the above considerations, we propose an
alternative approach relying on the concept of penalized DC
algorithm, which now eliminates the requirement of a non-
trivial initialization. Instead of solving (30), hereby we intro-
duce a set of matrix auxiliary variables {Si}Ii=1 and penalize
(30a) with a linear regularization term, i.e.,
min
x∈Ω,S
ϕˆ(n)(x,S;x(n))
, f0(x)− g0(x(n))
−∇gT0 (x(n))(x− x(n)) + τ (n)
I∑
i=1
Tr(Si)
(31a)
s.t. F i(x)−G i(x(n))−DG i(x(n))(x− x(n))  Si
(31b)
Si  0, i ∈ I (31c)
where τ (n) ≥ 0 denotes the weight associated with the penalty
term at the nth iteration and S , (S1, · · · ,SI). Auxiliary
matrix Si ∈ Hpi can be viewed as an abstract measure of
the extent to which the ith constraint in (30b) is violated. The
feasibility indicator Tr(Si) = 0 reveals that the ith constraint
is satisfied while Tr(Si) > 0 indicates the opposite. Therefore,
a feasible solution x ∈ Ω is found if ∑Ii=1 Tr(Si) = 0.
The proposed penalized DC algorithm, which iteratively
solves a sequence of sub-problems (31) with a specific up-
dating rule of τ is listed as Algorithm 1. The rationale for
this algorithm is that it starts with a possibly infeasible point
with a small penalty τ . In turn, this enables a fast descent of
the objective function at the beginning while the constraints
can be temporarily violated, i.e, Si  0. As the number of
iterations increases, τ gradually increases, thereby forcing the
7solution to be closer to and finally lie in the feasible region.
Remark 1: Before leaving this subsection, we discuss a few
important aspects of Algorithm 1.
1) Initialization: Instead of finding an initialization in the
non-convex feasible set of (29), i.e., x(0) ∈ F , {x ∈
Ω|F i(x)−G i(x)  0, i ∈ I}, Algorithm 1 is now initialized
with a point x(0) ∈ Ω, which leads to a more computationally
efficient convex feasible search problem. For implementation,
one may rely on general-purpose optimization solvers to find
x(0). More importantly, in many practical problems, x(0) can
be easily found by exploiting the specific structure of Ω. This
is illustrated in Section V for the robust secure relaying design
problem.
2) Termination Criterion: In practice, Algorithm 1 needs
to be terminated within a maximum of number iterations.
For instance, a reasonable termination criterion is that the
difference between successive solutions becomes small, i.e.,
‖x(n+1)−x(n)‖ ≤ δ and x(n) is (nearly) feasible, i.e.,∑I
i=1 Tr(Si) ≈ 0. If this criterion cannot be satisfied within a
preset number of iterations, we claim that the algorithm fails
to find a feasible solution within a limited time frame.
3) On the Updating Rule: The updating rule of τ in
(32) is motivated by the theory of exact penalty functions
for nonlinear optimization problems [41], [42]. The theory
suggests that if the penalty τ is larger than all the dual
variables {Φi} associated with (31b) (in our case, it is in the
form of PSD ordering), i.e., τI  Φi for all i, then (31) and
(30) become equivalent. Also from the definition of r(n) below
(32), we see that the unboundedness of {τ (n)} leads to the
unboundedness of {Φ(n)i } as well as ‖x(n+1) − x(n)‖ → 0.
This key property will be exploited later in proving the
convergence of Algorithm 1.
4) Solving the Sub-Problem (31): As mentioned earlier,
(31) is a general convex problem. Specifically, if Ω can be
represented by a number of finite linear matrix inequalities
(LMIs), and if f0(·) or one of the mappings F i(·) is nonlinear
in x, then (31) becomes a nonlinear convex SDP. To the best of
our knowledge, the availability of external solvers supporting
a general nonlinear SDP is still limited at the time of writing.
Briefly, the widely-used solvers such as SeDuMi and MOSEK
do not support nonlinear SDPs. However, it has been shown
in the literature that many beamforming/MIMO transceiver
design problems exhibit some common structures, namely: 1)
f0(·) is a quadratic function of x, i.e., f0(x) = xHPx where
P  0; 2) F i(·) is referred to as being Schur PSD-convex,
which can be expressed as F i(x) = Ai(x)Q−1i AHi (x) −
Bi(x), where Ai(x) and Bi(x) are linear mappings of x.
In this case, we can invoke the Schur complement rule for
transforming (31) into a standard SDP as follows:
min
x∈Ω,S,
t,{Ti}
t− g0(x(n))−∇gT0 (x(n))(x− x(n)) + τ (n)
I∑
i=1
Tr(Si)
s.t.
[
P x
xH t
]
 0
Ti −G i(x(n))−DG i(x(n))(x− x(n))  Si[
Qi A
H
i (x)
Ai(x) Ti
]
 0, Si  0, i ∈ I,
where t and {Ti} are auxiliary variables. The above problem
can be efficiently solved both by SeDuMi and MOSEK.
B. Convergence Analysis of the Penalized DC Algorithm
Since (31) may admit an infeasible solution to the original
problem (29), two important aspects regarding the convergence
of Algorithm 1 have to be examined: 1) whether the solution
generated by Algorithm 1 is feasible for (29)? and 2) if the
convergence properties of the conventional DC algorithm still
hold for the penalized DC algorithm? In this subsection,
the convergence properties of Algorithm 1 are analytically
established under the following assumptions4:
A.1) For any x ∈ Ω, there exists a vector h ∈ cone(Ω − x)
such that(DF i(x)−DG i(x))h ≺ 0, ∀i ∈ U(x) (33)
where U(x) , {i ∈ I∣∣F i(x)−G i(x) ⊀ 0};
A.2) Ω is bounded and the objective function f0(x) − g0(x)
is bounded from below;
A.3) Either f0(·) or g0(·) is strongly convex5.
Theorem 1: Let
{
x(n)
}
be the solution sequence generated
by Algorithm 1. Assuming that (29) is feasible and A.1)–A.3)
hold for (29). Then, one of the following scenarios applies:
1) Algorithm 1 terminates after a finite number n˘ of itera-
tions and x(n˘) is a stationary point of (29);
2) Algorithm 1 generates an infinite sequence
{
x(n)
}
and
any limit point of this sequence is a stationary point of
(29).
Proof: Please see Appendix B.
Based on the above results, it is not difficult to further prove
that the sequence of the objective function
{
ϕ(x(n))
}
of (29)
generated by Algorithm 1 is also convergent.
V. SUB-OPTIMAL SOLUTION TO THE ROBUST SECRECY
PROBLEM BASED ON THE PENALIZED DC ALGORITHM
In this section, we develop a solution to our robust secure
relaying problem (12) by applying the proposed penalized DC
algorithmic framework.
A. Reformulating (12) as a PSD-DC Program
The transformation of (12) into a standard PSD-DC program
as defined in (29), involves several changes of variables
and matrix manipulations. Specifically, by introducing a new
4We remark that A.1)–A.3) are mild assumptions from both theoretical
and practical perspectives. In fact, A.1) is the so-called extended Magsanrian-
Fromovitz constraint qualification, which is considered to be a rather mild
condition for classic non-convex nonlinear optimization problems [41]. In
A.2), Ω is bounded due to the power constraints imposed in the design
problem, while the objective function is usually a performance metric such
as the SINR or the mean-square-error (MSE), which are lower-bounded by
zero. Regarding A.3), consider the objective function ϕ(x) (29a) which can
be equivalently written as ϕ( x) = (f0(x) +
ρ
2
‖·‖2)− (g0(x) + ρ2 ‖·‖2) for
any given ρ > 0. Therefore, without loss of generality, we can always find a
DC decomposition (f0, g0) such that both f0 and g0 are strongly convex.
5A function f(·) is said to be strongly convex with parameter
ρ > 0, if the following inequality holds for all x,y in its domain:
(∇f(x)−∇f(y))T (x− y) ≥ ρ‖x − y‖2, or equivalently, f(y) ≥
f(x) +∇f(x)T (y − x) + ρ
2
‖x− y‖2.
8variable U , σSW and using (18), (12) can be reformulated
as follows:
min
W,Ψ,σS
U,t,ρ
− |hH2 Uh1|2/t (34a)
σ2R‖hH2 W‖2 + Tr(h2hH2 Ψ) + σ2D ≤ t (34b)
‖Uh1‖2 + σ2R‖W‖2F + Tr(Ψ) ≤ PR (34c)
0 ≤ σS ≤ σ¯S, Ψ  0 (34d)
PHk Uh1h
H
1 U
HPk −Λk(ρk)− γPHk ΨPk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fk(U,Ψ,ρ)
− γσ2RPHk WWHPk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gk(W)
 0, k ∈ K (34e)
U = σSW, (34f)
where t is an auxiliary variable and we recall that σ¯S is the
upper-bound of σS, as defined in (16). It is not difficult to
verify that both functions F k(·) and Gk(·) defined above are
PSD-convex mappings. The above problem is still non-convex
due to the bilinear equality constraint (34f). To this end, we
rely on [33, Lemma 1] for equivalently converting (34f) to a
combination of an LMI and a DC inequality: L11 U σSINRUH L22 WH
σSINR W INR
  0 (35)
Tr(L11)︸ ︷︷ ︸
f1(L11)
−Tr(σ2SINR)︸ ︷︷ ︸
g1(σS)
≤ 0, (36)
where L11 and L22 are auxiliary matrix variables.
For notational simplicity, let us define x =
[σS, vec(W)
T , vec(U)T , vec(Ψ)T , t,ρT , vec(L11)T , vec(L22)T ]T
collectively denoting all the design and auxiliary variables.
The following compact convex set is also defined for ease of
presentation:
Ω = {x : (34b), (34c), (34d), (35)}. (37)
Furthermore, in order to guarantee the strong convexity of
the functions in the DC decomposition of (34a), we equiva-
lently rewrite (34a) as
ϕ(x) = ‖x‖2︸︷︷︸
f0(·)
−( |hH2 Uh1|2/t+ ‖x‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
g0(·)
)
. (38)
Then, using the above definitions, (34) can be equivalently
reformulated as a standard PSD-DC program:
min
x∈Ω
f0(x)− g0(x) (39a)
s.t. f1(L11)− g1(σS) ≤ 0 (39b)
F k(U,Ψ, ρ)−Gk(W)  0, k ∈ K, (39c)
which completes the transformation.
Before proceeding further to the algorithm design, a key
observation is of interest, which essentially motivates the
development of the penalized DC framework:
Remark 2 (On the Initialization of (39)): As mentioned in
Section IV, solving (39) by the conventional DC algorithm
would require finding a feasible initialization, which corre-
sponds to the non-convex feasibility check problem:
Find x ∈ Ω s.t. (39b), (39c).
However, solving the above problem requires the same amount
of computational efforts as solving (39). If we turn our
attention back to the original formulation of (12), the only
trivial initialization can be (σS,W,Ψ) = (0,0,0), which
corresponds to the “silent mode” with zero information leak-
age and hence satisfies the robust secrecy constraints (12b).
Unfortunately, a careful inspection reveals that (0,0,0) is
already a stationary point of (39) and clearly the conventional
DC algorithm will stall at the point (0,0,0), which is not a
meaningful solution from a practical perspective.
B. Algorithm Design
To involve Algorithm 1 for solving (39), now only an initial-
ization x(0) ∈ Ω is required. Since Ω is convex and compact,
we are able to exploit its structure, i.e., (34b)–(34d), and con-
veniently select a reasonably “good” starting point as follows:
σ
(0)
S = σ¯S, Ψ(0) = 0, W(0) =
(
PR
σ¯S2‖h1‖2+σ2RNR
) 1
2
INR and
U(0) = σ¯SW
(0). To construct the algorithm, we need to
linearize the concave parts −g0(·), −g1(·) and −Gk(·) by
their first-order Taylor series expansion, which corresponds to
Step 1 in Algorithm 1 and leads to:
− gˆ0(x;x(n))
= −
∣∣hH2 U(n)h1∣∣2
t(n)
+
∣∣hH2 U(n)h1∣∣2
(t(n))2
(
t− t(n)
)
− 1
t(n)
2 Re
{
hH2 U
(n)h1h
H
1
(
U−U(n)
)H
h2
}
− x(n) (x−x(n) )H (40)
− gˆ1(σS;σ(n)S ) = −NR(σ(n)S )2 − 2NRσ(n)S
(
σS − σ(n)S
)
(41)
− Gˆk(W;W(n)) = −γσ2RPHk W(n)
(
W(n)
)H
Pk
− 2γNR Re
(
PHk W
(n)
(
W −W(n)
)H
Pk
)
.
(42)
It is observed that Ω can be represented by a set of LMIs based
on the technique introduced in [43] (details of this transfor-
mations are omitted for brevity), and F k(·) is Schur PSD-
convex. Then, using the technique discussed under Remark 1-
4), the penalized version of (39) can be recast as the following
standard SDP:
min
x∈Ω,s
{Tk},{Sk}
f0(x)− gˆ0(x;x(n)) + τ (n)
(
s+
K∑
k=1
Tr(Sk)
)
s.t. f1(L11)− gˆ1(σS;σ(n)S ) ≤ s
Tk −Λ(ρk)− γPHk ΨPk − Gˆk(W;W(n))  Sk[
σ2RINR h
H
1 U
HPk
PHk Uh1 Tk
]
 0
s ≥ 0, Sk  0, k ∈ K, (43)
9where s and {Sk} are the feasibility indicators, and {Tk}
represents a set of auxiliary variables. Subsequently, replacing
(31) with the above specified sub-problem in Algorithm 1, we
arrive at the penalized DC algorithm for (39) with proven
convergence towards a stationary point6.
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
The efficacy of the proposed solutions to the robust secure
relaying problem is verified by numerical simulations. In our
experiments, the coefficients of the legitimate channels h1 and
h2, as well as the estimated eves’ channels {gˆ1,k} and {gˆ2,k}
are generated by identically and independently distributed
(i.i.d.) complex circular Gaussian distributions with zero-mean
and unit-variance. Equal radii are assumed for all ∆g1,k and
for all ∆g2,k, i.e., ε1,k = ε1 and ε2,k = ε2 for all k. The
power budget of S is normalized to PS = 1 and that of R
is set to PR = 2. It is also assumed that an antenna array of
size NR = 3 is employed by R. The noise variances are set
to σ2R = 0.05, σ
2
D = 0.05 and σ
2
E,k = 0.01 ∀k. The above
parameters are fixed, unless otherwise stated.
1) Convergence: We first study the convergence behavior
of Algorithm 1. We simulate 200 channel realizations and
among these, two different types of behaviors are observed; a
representative case for each type is then plotted in the left and
right parts of Fig. 2. In each case, the top sub-figure shows the
convergence of the SINR achieved at D, whilst the bottom sub-
figure plots the evolution of the feasibility indicator. The first
case (left) exhibits a behavior similar to the conventional DC
algorithm. The second case (right) shows a more interesting
behavior, where the algorithm begins with an infeasible point
and attempts to find a region (still infeasible) associated with
a larger objective value. As the penalty term in (31a) begins
to play a gradually more important role, the emphasis shifts
towards finding a feasible point near the above located region.
Hence, the value of SINR drops, since the feasibility has to
be enforced now. Finally, the SINR remains approximately
constant, because a stationary point has been reached. The
convergence behavior is consistent with the discussions and
proof provided in Section IV.
2) Secrecy: To evaluate the relay-aided transmission se-
crecy achieved by the proposed solutions, i.e., to quantify
how consistently the robust secrecy constraints (12b) can be
satisfied, we follow a probabilistic approach similar to [32,
Section VI–B]. In this example, the coefficients of ∆gˆ1k
and ∆gˆ2k are generated as i.i.d. zero-mean complex circular
Gaussian random variables with a variance of σ2h = 0.05.
The radii of the uncertainty regions in (10) and (11) are
then determined by ε1 = σ2hgammaincinv(Pr, 0.5) and ε2 =
σ2hgammaincinv(Pr, 0.5N
2
R ), where gammaincinv(·) repre-
sents the inverse incomplete Gamma function, as defined in
MATLAB and Pr is a predefined bounding probability, say, Pr =
95%, c.f. [32, (61)]. The empirical cumulative distribution
functions (CDFs) of the mutual information leakage at both
eves are shown in Fig 3. Both the proposed solutions ensure
that the mutual information leakage stays below the data rate
6It is not difficult verify that A.1)–A.3) hold for (39), and therefore, the
convergence result in Theorem 1 is valid for (31).
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Fig. 2: Convergence behavior of Algorithm 1. Left: Case 1.
Right: Case 2.
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Fig. 3: Empirical CDFs of the mutual information leakage at
eves. The legitimate S is transmitting at Rd = 2 bps/Hz.
of legitimate UEs for more than 98% of the realizations,
whilst the non-robust design leads to a frequent violation of
the secrecy constraints, namely for more than 25% of the
realizations.
3) Reliability: Having verified the secrecy of the proposed
solutions, we now compare the attainable transmission re-
liability in terms of the SINR achieved at D. In Fig. 4,
SINRD is plotted for a set of 50 independent experiments and
two different numbers of eves, i.e., K = 2 and K = 4,
are considered. The curve labeled “Nullspace Beamforming”
refers to a method, where R attempts to nullifies eves’
reception by exploiting the null space of [gˆ2,1, · · · , gˆ2,K ] in
the design of the AF relaying matrix [13], [19]. Therefore, the
method is only applicable, when NR > K. In both cases, we
observe that the performance of the proposed penalized DC
algorithm is very close to the globally optimal solution. In
the case of K = 2, both the proposed solutions significantly
outperform the conventional nullspace beamforming method.
We then study how different system configurations impact
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Fig. 4: Achieved SINR at D. Top sub-figure: K = 2 eves.
Bottom sub-figure: K = 4 eves.
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Fig. 5: Achieved SINR at D. Left sub-figure: SINRD versus
NR. K = 3 eves are considered. Right sub-figure: SINRD
versus K.
the SINR achieved by the different approaches. In the left sub-
figure of Fig. 5, the SINR achieved by the proposed solutions
and by the conventional nullspace beamforming is plotted as
a function of the number of antenna elements employed at
R in the case of K = 3. Two different sizes of uncertainty
regions are considered, i.e., ε1 = ε2 = 0.1 and ε1 = ε2 = 0.2.
The SINR achieved monotonically increases with NR in both
cases due to the higher diversity gleaned from the antenna
array. Again, both the proposed solutions consistently ex-
hibit a better performance than the conventional nullspace
beamforming. Observe that when the channel uncertainty is
increased (ε1 = ε2 = 0.2), the legitimate UEs are confined to
a relatively low transmission power for satisfying the robust
secrecy constraints, leading to a lower received SINR at D. In
the right sub-figure of Fig. 5, the impact of different number
of eves on the SINR achieved is assessed in the case of
NR = 3. The SINR monotonically decreases, when there
are more eves and therefore, the legitimate UEs have to
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Fig. 6: Achieved SINR at D as a function of size of uncertainty
region. Two data rates of legitimate UEs are considered,
namely, Rd = 2bps/Hz and Rd = 2.5bps/Hz.
TABLE I: Average solver time (in seconds) for different
algorithms
Num. of Relay Ant. NR
Alg. 2 3 4 5 6
N
um
.o
f
e
v
e
s
K 2
Global 1.31 4.44 22.44 111.26 553.11
P-DCA 0.69 1.42 2.58 4.73 8.38
3
Global 1.59 5.95 28.61 141.54 680.90
P-DCA 0.88 1.80 3.45 6.52 11.31
4
Global 1.83 7.14 33.29 165.29 798.69
P-DCA 1.05 2.24 4.60 8.01 14.09
5
Global 2.19 8.38 41.23 203.20 924.32
P-DCA 1.20 2.66 5.43 9.95 17.12
reduce their transmission power for preventing the information
leakage. For completeness, we also investigate how robustly
the proposed solutions can behave against the ECSI errors by
varying the size of the uncertainty regions over a wider range.
The results, which are shown in Fig. 6 again demonstrates the
superiority of our proposed solutions.
4) Computational Complexity: Last but not least, we have
to evidence the lower complexity of the proposed penalized
DC algorithm as compared to the globally optimal solution.
The solver time of the different algorithms averaged over
100 independent realizations is shown in Table I for different
values of NR and K. It is observed that the solver time of the
globally optimal solution escalates rapidly upon increasing NR
or K, which is consistent with the worst-case complexity anal-
ysis of Section III. By contrast, the solver time of the proposed
penalized DC algorithm increases more slowly compared to
the former. Specifically, when the number of relay antennas NR
becomes large, the solver time of the penalized DC algorithm
is less than 5% of that of the globally optimal solution, which
demonstrates the gains of the proposed algorithm in terms of
computational complexity.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Robust design of secure MIMO relaying was studied in
the presence of multiple eves. We jointly optimized the
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power of S, the AF matrix and the AN covariance at R for
maximizing the received SINR at D, while imposing a set of
mutual information leakage-based secrecy constraints. Given
only imperfect ECSI, the resultant problem has been shown
to be non-convex and challenging. First a globally optimal
solution based on SDR was proposed. To alleviate the high
complexity associated with this method, a computationally
efficient sub-optimal solution relying on a newly proposed
penalized DC algorithm was developed. This algorithm is
capable of efficiently finding a stationary solution to a general
non-convex SDP represented by a PSD-DC program, without
the need of a non-trivial feasible initialization. We bench-
marked the performance of the proposed solutions using a few
numerical examples. It shows that the proposed solutions yield
a significantly better performance than the non-robust and null-
space beamforming methods. Additionally, the penalized DC
algorithm typically attains a performance close to that of the
globally optimal solution.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Firstly, expanding all the quadratic terms in W
in (19a) and (19b), and invoking the identities
Tr
(
AHBCDH
)
= vec (A)
H (
DT ⊗B) vec (C) and
Tr
(
AHBA
)
= vec (A)
H
(I⊗B) vec (A), (19a) and
(19b) can be recast as (24a) and (24b), respectively, with
X = wwH .
Next, we transform (19c). Recall that Θ(W,Ψ) =
σ2SWh1h
H
1 W
H − γσ2RWWH − γΨ, where the first term on
the right hand side is equivalent to
σ2SWh1h
H
1 W
H = σ2S(h
T
1 ⊗ INR)wwH(hT1 ⊗ INR)H , (44)
which follows by using vec(ABC) = (CT ⊗ A) vec(B).
To transform the second term, we write W =
[w1, · · · ,wl, · · · ,wNR ], where wl denotes the lth column of
W. Then WWH can be equivalently expressed as
WWH =
NR∑
l=1
wlw
H
l . (45)
By expressing the linear relation betweenwl and w in a matrix
form as wl = Elw, (45) can further be written as
WWH =
NR∑
l=1
Elww
HEHl . (46)
Using (44) and (46), Θ(W,Ψ) becomes equivalent to
Θ(W,Ψ) = σ2SH1ww
HHH1 − γσ2R
NR∑
l=1
Elww
HEHl − γΨ.
(47)
Finally, invoking X = wwH and Rank(X) = 1, (19) is
readily reformulated as (24) with the aid of (47).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We first have to examine the KKT conditions of the sub-
problem (31). Since the latter is convex and strictly fea-
sible, i.e., Slater’s constraint qualification is satisfied, the
KKT sufficient conditions hold for the optimal solution
(x(n+1),S(n+1)): there exist some dual variables Φ(n+1)i 
0,Z
(n+1)
i  0 for i ∈ I so that (48), shown at the top of
the next page, holds. In (48a), N (Ω,x) denotes the normal
cone of Ω at x, and “∗” denotes a bilinear operator defined as
Z ∗A = [Tr(A1Z), · · · ,Tr(AnZ)]T for any Z ∈ Hp, where
A =
∑n
i=1 xiAi with Ai ∈ Hp for i = 1, · · · , n.
We prove the first scenario. If Algorithm 1 terminates after
a finite number n˘ of iterations, it follows from the termination
criterion (see Remark 1) that x(n˘+1) = x(n˘) and S(n˘+1)i =
0 for all i, i.e., x˘ is a feasible point of (29). Letting n =
n˘ and substituting the above relations into (48), we obtain
(49), as shown below (48). A careful examination reveals the
equivalence between (49) and the KKT conditions of (29).
Therefore, it is proved that x(n˘) is a KKT stationary point of
(29).
We now proceed to prove the second scenario. The key
ingredients of the proof are to show that any limit point of
{x(n)} is feasible to (29) and the sequence of the dual variable
{Φ(n)i } is bounded, so that there exists at least one limit point
of {Φ(n)i }. Then we show that any primal-dual pair of the limit
point satisfies the KKT conditions of (29).
To prove that any limit point of {x(n)} is a feasible point
of (29), we rely on the following claims:
Claim 1: There exists a finite iteration index n˜, so that
τ (n) = τ (n˜), ∀n ≥ n˜. (50)
Proof: Please see Appendix C.
Claim 2: The sequence {x(n)} satisfies
lim
n→∞‖x
(n+1) − x(n)‖ = 0. (51)
Proof: The proof is omitted here owing lack of space, but
it can be found in the supplementary file uploaded with this
manuscript.
Since {τ (n)} is bounded by Claim 1, as indicated by the
updating rule (32), we have
τ (n˜) ≥ λmax
[ I∑
i=1
Φ
(n˜+1)
i
]
+ δ1. (52)
Invoking Weyl’s inequality, (52) further implies
τ (n˜) ≥ λmax[Φ(n˜+1)i ] + δ1, i ∈ I. (53)
or equivalently, τ (n)I  Φ(n+1)i + δ1I for all n ≥ n˜. Then, in
view of the complementary slackness (48b), it readily follows
that Z(n+1)i  0. By (48e), we obtain S(n+1)i = 0 for all
n ≥ n˜, which means that x(n) is a feasible point of (29) for all
n ≥ n˜. Without loss of generality, considering a subsequence
{x(nj)} of {x(n)}, its limit point limj→∞ x(nj) = x¯ is
therefore feasible to (29). Furthermore, (52) implies that the
subsequence {Φ(nj)i } is bounded, and therefore we can assume
that
lim
j→∞
Φ
(nj)
i = Φ¯i, i ∈ I. (54)
Now what remains to show is that any primal-dual pair of
the limit point (x¯, {Φ¯i}) is a KKT stationary point of (29).
Let us replace n with nj in (48) and let j → ∞. By noting
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0 ∈ ∇f0(x(n+1))−∇g0(x(n)) +
I∑
i=1
(
Φ
(n+1)
i ∗
(
DF i(x(n+1))−DG i(x(n))
))
+N (Ω,x(n+1)) (48a)
τ (n)I−Φ(n+1)i − Z(n+1)i = 0, i ∈ I (48b)
F i(x(n+1))−G i(x(n))−DG(x(n))(x(n+1) − x(n))  S(n+1)i , i ∈ I (48c)
Tr
(
Φ
(n+1)
i
(
F i(x(n+1))−G i(x(n))−DG(x(n))(x(n+1) − x(n))− S(n+1)i
))
= 0, i ∈ I (48d)
x(n+1) ∈ Ω, S(n+1)i  0, Φ(n+1)i  0, Z(n+1)i  0, Tr(S(n+1)i Z(n+1)i ) = 0, i ∈ I (48e)
0 ∈ ∇f0(x(n˘))−∇g0(x(n˘)) +
I∑
i=1
(
Φ
(n˘)
i ∗
(
DF i(x(n˘))−DG i(x(n˘))
))
+N (Ω,x(n˘)) (49a)
F i(x(n˘))−G i(x(n˘))  0, i ∈ I (49b)
Tr
(
Φ
(n˘+1)
i
(
F i(x(n˘))−G i(x(n˘))
))
= 0, i ∈ I (49c)
x(n˘) ∈ Ω, Φ(n˘+1)i  0. (49d)
that x(nj) and x(nj+1) are asymptotically close as indicated
by Claim 2, we obtain
0 ∈ ∇f0(x¯)−∇g0(x¯)
+
I∑
i=1
(
Φ¯i ∗ (DF i(x¯)−DG i(x¯))
)
+N (Ω, x¯) (55a)
F i(x¯)−G i(x¯)  0, Φ¯i  0, i ∈ I (55b)
Tr
(
(F i(x¯)−G i(x¯)) Φ¯i
)
= 0, i ∈ I (55c)
x¯ ∈ Ω, (55d)
which exactly represents the KKT conditions of the PSD-DC
problem (29). Noting the bounded nature of {x(n)} assumed
in A.2), it readily follows that there exists at least one limit
point of {x(n)} and by (55), any limit point of {x(n)} is a
KKT stationary point of (29).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF CLAIM 1
We argue by contradiction. Assume the contrary, i.e., that
limn→∞ τ (n) = +∞. From the updating rule (32), it follows
without loss of generality that there exist infinitely many
indices j so that
τ (nj) < λmax
[ I∑
i=1
Φ
(nj+1)
i
]
+ δ1, (56)
τ (nj) < ‖x(nj+1) − x(nj)‖−1. (57)
By possibly restricting to a subsequence of {nj}, without loss
of generality, we can further assume that there exists at least
some i ∈ SI , where SI denotes a subset of I, so that
lim
j→∞
λmax[Φ
(nj+1)
i ] = +∞
⇔ lim
j→∞
‖Φ(nj+1)i ‖F = +∞, i ∈ SI (58)
lim
j→∞
‖x(nj+1) − x(nj)‖ = 0. (59)
Let limj→∞ x(nj) = x¯, and then we show that F i(x¯) −
G i(x¯) ⊀ 0 must hold for i ∈ SI . Again, we show this by
contradiction. If F i(x¯) − G i(x¯) ≺ 0, then for a sufficiently
large j, we must have:
F i(x(nj+1))−G i(x(nj))
−DG(x(nj))(x(nj+1) − x(nj))− S(nj+1)i ≺ 0. (60)
This is due to (59) such that
lim
j→∞
(
F i(x(nj+1))−G i(x(nj))
−DG(x(nj))(x(nj+1) − x(nj))
)
= F i(x¯)−G i(x¯) (61)
as well as S(nj+1)i  0. By the complementary slackness
condition (48d), it readily follows that provided j becomes
sufficiently large, we have Φ(nj+1)i = 0 for i ∈ SI , which
contradicts the previous result of (58). Therefore, we have
F i(x¯)−G i(x¯) ⊀ 0 for i ∈ SI .
Let us assume, without loss of generality, that
lim
j→∞
Φ
(nj+1)
i∑I
i=1‖Φ(nj+1)i ‖F
= Φˆi  0. (62)
and it is easy to observe that Φˆi = 0 for i ∈ I\SI and Φˆi 6= 0
for i ∈ SI . We now replace n with nj in (48). Dividing both
sides of (48a) by
∑I
i=1‖Φ(nj+1)i ‖F , as well as taking the limit
as j →∞ and using the result of (59), we obtain
0 ∈
∑
i∈SI
Φˆi ∗
(DF i(x¯)−DG i(x¯))+N (Ω, x¯). (63)
However, A.1) indicates that there exists some h ∈ Cn so
that (DF i(x¯)−DG i(x¯))h ≺ 0 for i ∈ SI . It is seen that
(63) contradicts A.1). Now we can assume that there exists a
finite index n˜ so that
τ (n) = τ (n˜), ∀n ≥ n˜. (64)
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